INTRODUCTION
Countries are increasingly specializing in stages of production instead of specific goods.
This fragmentation of production processes-known as outsourcing or production sharingtends to boost trade in intermediate inputs, leading to the foreign assembly of domestic parts, or alternatively, the domestic assembly of foreign parts. Increased outsourcing has sparked debate in federal and state governments and the popular press. Much of the discourse has been increasingly hostile toward outsourcing organizations. The Congress has limited outsourcing on federal contracts, while thirty-seven state legislatures have limited outsourcing or are currently proposing legislation to do so. Perhaps as a result of negative press coverage, and possibly causing some of the anti-outsourcing legislation, 73 percent of Americans believe that the government should discourage companies from hiring workers in foreign countries. 1 However, surprisingly little is known about the types of firms and establishments that outsource and the effects of outsourcing on these organizations. In this paper I intend to fill this gap buy using plant-level U.S. manufacturing data to identify differences in the characteristics of outsourcers and non-outsourcers, with a particular focus on two productivity-related aspects of outsourcing. First, I test whether organizations can be sorted into outsourcing or nonoutsourcing groups on the basis of their productivity levels. Second, I examine differences in the rates of productivity growth between outsourcers and non-outsourcers.
On one hand, outsourcing organizations could be marginal in that they are struggling to remain profitable in a world of increasing competition. On the other hand, these organizations could be larger and more productive than their non-outsourcing counterparts. Focusing on characteristics and productivity will help make such a distinction, which has important policy and research implications.
Much of the academic literature on production sharing is theoretical, looks at the relationship between outsourcing and wages, or measures the importance of outsourcing in the global economy.
2 The current body of theoretical work makes predictions about outsourcing at the firm-and plant-levels, but a lack of microdata has restricted empirical investigations into outsourcing at this level of disaggregation.
Testing whether productivity differs between outsourcers and non-outsourcers rests heavily upon the work of Antràs and Helpman (2004) . Antràs and Helpman (2004) extend a framework put forth in Helpman (2002, 2005) to incorporate productivity and its implications for a firm's decision to outsource. In their analysis, an exogenous productivity distribution and cost differences drive firms' outsourcing behavior. 3 In equilibrium, different types of firms choose to outsource from either domestic or foreign sources on the basis of their productivity draws. Cost differences cause higher-productivity firms to outsource from foreign sources, while lower-productivity firms outsource domestically. The intuition for such sorting derives from the inability of low-productivity firms' to cover the fixed costs of foreign outsourcing. This implication will allow for a test of productivity and its relation to outsourcing-specifically, whether high-productivity firms are more likely to partake in foreign outsourcing.
In addition, Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile (1992) and Ethier (1982) provide frameworks in which productivity changes can be traced to input selection. Although these papers do not specifically address production sharing, they are directly applicable to the issues faced by firms and plants that outsource. Ethier (1982) shows that new intermediate inputs allow for greater specialization in resource use, which in turn leads to higher productivity. Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile (1992) continue this thread in the literature by identifying the contributions to growth arising from increased quantities of inputs and from an increased range of input selection.
Growth in expenditure on new inputs for a firm or plant should be positively correlated with total factor productivity. This result is verified through tests on a sample of South Korean conglomerates. Feenstra revisits these issues six years later, stating that " [t] he same productivity gains discussed in this literature apply when firms shift their production activities across countries" (Feenstra, 1998, p.22) The aforementioned papers supply the framework for the following analysis of outsourcing. Antràs and Helpman (2004) present a testable hypothesis regarding an organization's productivity level and its outsourcing behavior. Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile (1992) and Ethier (1982) provide the impetus for analyzing productivity dynamics over time.
Empirical work on outsourcing at the plant or firm level for the United States is limited by the available data. One paper that overcomes the current lack of data is Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2003) , which examines the foreign determinants of imported intermediate inputs.
The authors find that demand for imported intermediate inputs is negatively correlated with trade
costs, and sensitive to labor-costs and host country characteristics. 4 Previous work on exporters and multinationals is related to research on outsourcing.
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The exporting literature finds a premium for the characteristics of exporters relative to those of non-exporters. Exporters are "exceptional." They are larger, have higher value added and output, pay higher wages to skilled and unskilled workers, employ more capital and skilled workers, and have higher static levels of productivity.
The literature on multinationals mirrors that on exporters. Two papers by Jensen (1998a, 1998b) establish that multinationals operating in the United States are larger, have higher output, wages, and productivity, and are more capital-and skill-intensive than are nonmultinationals operating in the United States. Similar to the exporting and multinational literature, I will test whether such premia exist for outsourcers, while controlling for exporter and multinational status.
There are three main findings in this paper. First, outsourcers are "outstanding." There are premia for outsourcers over non-outsourcing organizations for plant and firm characteristics, with the exception of wages paid to workers. Second, organizations that outsource have higher productivity, even after controlling for firm and plant characteristics. Finally, firm-level productivity growth is significantly higher for outsourcers, a result that does not hold at the plant level.
There are four additional sections. Section 2 outlines the data and methodology. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics and determines whether or not outsourcers are "outstanding."
Section 4 presents the productivity estimation results and section 5 concludes. Two sets of restrictions on the data help resolve both of these issues. The restrictions are called restricted-A and restricted-B. The restricted-A set selects the top ten two-digit outsourcing industries from Feenstra and Hanson's four-digit outsourcing measure (1996) . 8 Each four-digit industry is aggregated to the two-digit level and ranked by the amount of outsourcing. The top ten two-digit outsourcing industries are taken as a subset from the twenty two-digit industries. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data
Firms and Plants
It may sound obvious, but the majority of research using plant-level data is performed at the plant level. This allows the researcher to make the most of the heterogeneity within the microdata, but may not be the optimal level of disaggregation for an analysis of outsourcing. The decision to shut down a part of a production process and purchase inputs from overseas is most likely made at the firm level, where top management has the best information about relative productivity and profitability between units within an organization. The following work includes a plant-level analysis, while also looking at the same questions at the firm level. Aggregating this data to the firm level would lead to 6 firms from 10 plants. Firm A would be an aggregation over 4 establishments, Firm B would be the aggregation over 2 establishments, while the remaining 4 plants are also defined as firms.
Estimating Productivity-Choice of Production Function 9 The following analysis was also performed using the top ten two-digit industries from the more restrictive narrow measure of Feenstra and Hanson (1999) . The results were robust to either measure.
I use total factor productivity to measure plant-and firm-level productivity. The choice of the form of the production function matters when analyzing the productivity differences between outsourcing and non-outsourcing establishments. For example, consider the case of a production function, in logs, of the following form:
where Y is output, L is labor, K is capital, M is intermediate inputs, and total factor productivity is
When measuring productivity at the plant or firm level, the production function In other words, using output and intermediate inputs to estimate a production function may not be as robust to differences in technology across producers.
To avoid problems arising from differences in intermediate inputs usage, I estimate a value-added production function that takes the following form:
with total factor productivity calculated as
The use of value added will circumvent differences in productivity arising from What we really care about when estimating productivity is the ability to transform inputs into a level of output. This measure should change when either more or less output is created from a given level of inputs, not as a result of differences in the usage or measurement of intermediate inputs.
Estimating Productivity-Levinsohn and Petrin
I estimate total factor productivity for both plants and firms using Levinsohn and Petrin's methodology (2003) to control for simultaneity between unobservable productivity and the observable input choices. A firm-and plant-level analysis is conducted because the decision to shut down part of a production process and purchase foreign inputs is most likely made at the firm level, where top management has the best information about relative productivity and profitability between units within an organization.
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The estimated production function in logs is
where it y is value added for plant or firm i at time t , it p and it np represent the variable inputs of production workers and nonproduction workers, it k is capital, and β is an input elasticity.
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The sum it it η ω + represents composite error, where it ω serves as a transmitted plant-specific efficiency that affects plant decisions and it η is an independently and identically distributed shock not known to the econometrician or a firm-level decisionmaker. The productivity residuals were also calculated using ordinary least squares. The following results were robust for each approach.
to investment, as the control for the unobservable productivity shock. First, the investment proxy is valid only for plants that report nonzero investment. The case in which investment is equal to zero is especially significant in terms of using developing-country, plant-level data sets.
12 Surprisingly, in the 1987-96 panel of plants constructed from the CMF and the ASM, 10 percent of the establishments are missing investment data, whereas 4 percent of plants are missing information on purchased electricity. The second benefit of the LP approach over the OP approach arises if adjustment costs are nonconvex. Nonconvexities in investment demand may lead to nonresponses or partial responses in investment to a given productivity shock.
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Empirical Specifications
The following empirical specifications test for differences in productivity between outsourcing and non-outsourcing organizations. Each test is performed on both firms and plants for the restricted and unrestricted samples. I use a probit specification to test for an increase in the probability of outsourcing based on the level of productivity, and I employ a productivity change framework to explore whether outsourcing organizations differ in productivity growth at the firm or plant level.
Probit Analysis
Once productivity is estimated, I use a probit specification to test whether plants and firms with higher productivity are more likely to outsource. I estimate LP productivity using the entire panel 
Productivity Changes
Outsourcing may lead to changes in productivity over time through new intermediate inputs that allow for greater specialization. We cannot say much about the transition from a nonoutsourcing organization to an outsourcing one because of the limitations of using only two sample years for the foreign content of intermediate inputs. However, we can compare the productivity growth rates of outsourcers and non-outsourcers, though questions regarding causality are left unanswered.
Comparisons of the growth rates of exporters and non-exporters have recently been made in the literature. 14 For the United States, no significant evidence has been found to support higher productivity growth for exporting establishments. In some cases, exporter status has been found to have a negative effect on productivity growth. I employ a specification similar to that used by Jensen (1999, 2004a) to test for differences in productivity growth rates between outsourcing and non-outsourcing establishments. Specifically,
where the dependent variable is log differences in the LP measure of productivity, it PS is an indicator of production-sharing behavior, and it X is a matrix of controls that are similar to those in specification (6) and that include time dummies.
One problem that arises in the estimation of (7) is that it PS does not vary over time.
During census years, the survey respondents queried regarding their foreign content usage are a subset of the ASM sample. That sample changes every five years, so there is only minimal information on the transition between outsourcing and non-outsourcing by organizations; 13 Doms and Dunne (1998) describe nonconvexities in manufacturing investment data from the U.S. census. 14 For examples using census microdata, see Jensen (1999 and 2004a) .
for all t if a firm or plant purchases foreign content in either 1987 or 1992. Given this restriction, (7) will allow us to test for differences in the productivity growth rates between outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms and plants. As firms outsource parts of their production processes, productivity should increase as the inefficient and costly divisions are closed down, leading to a positive expected coefficient 1 θ for firms.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND "OUTSTANDING" OUTSOURCERS Descriptive Statistics
The The decrease in outsourcing plants from 1987 to 1992 is surprising given the overall trend toward outsourcing. One reason for a decrease in the number of outsourcers may be outsourcing's role in smoothing production throughout the business cycle. 17 The brief recession in the early 1990s may account for the decline in the share of outsourcing establishments.
However, the fraction of outsourced intermediates increased from 1987 to 1992. The amount of outsourced intermediates across all establishments rose from 9.15 percent to 9.92 percent of parts and materials purchases. For organizations that outsource, this number increased from 17.79 percent to 18.38 percent.
In order to further understand the data used within this analysis, I decomposed the 15 The ASM surveys roughly 20% of all manufacturing plants with about 70% of all manufacturing output. 16 Only 3 valid answers were recorded. Establishments that responded "1" purchased foreign content. Those that answered "2" did not purchase foreign content. Answers of "0" were for establishments that did not know if purchases or foreign content were made or not. In some cases answers of 3 or 5 were in the data, but were discarded because they did not correspond to a selection on the survey form. 17 For an analysis of the reasons for a firm's decision to contract work out, see Abraham and Taylor (1996) .
pooled data by plants and output into different types of organizations. A ranking of the fraction of total plants that purchase foreign content (column 3) changes slightly from 1987 to 1992, but the top six industries remain the same in both years. The largest fraction of plants that outsource for both years is in tobacco, leather and leather products, instruments and related products, electrical equipment and machinery, transportation equipment industries, and miscellaneous manufacturing.
The fourth column of table 4 looks at the percentage of parts and materials outsourced, as reported on the survey form. The largest outsourcing industries in 1987 are printing and publishing, petroleum and coal, miscellaneous manufacturing, apparel, and leather products. In 1992, this ranking changes to petroleum and coal, printing and publishing, apparel, primary metal industries, food, and tobacco. The existence of tobacco, petroleum and coal, and the food and kindred products reflects that the measure of imported intermediate inputs as a proxy for outsourcing captures imports of raw materials, underscoring the importance of using the restricted measures of outsourcing as defined in section 2.
The fourth column is most similar to Hanson's (1996 and 1998) broad measure of outsourcing. Comparing the ranking of the top outsourcing industries from Table 4 and 5 "Outstanding" Outsourcers
Characteristics of Plants and Firms
A large body of evidence suggests that exporters are "exceptional" when compared with nonexporters that have similar characteristics. Are organizations that purchase foreign content smaller and less competitive, striving for a cost advantage against competition? Or, as with exporters, are they larger and more productive organizations that take advantage of international production to increase and maintain their current positions in the market?
A first step in answering these questions is to summarize basic plant characteristics across the outsourcing proxy. Specifically, means and standard deviations for the following characteristics are presented as of 1987 for both plants and firms: total employment, total value of shipments, wages per worker, shipments and value added per worker, capital and investment per worker, and fraction of skilled workers in the labor force (tables 6 and 7).
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At the plant level, both total employment and total value of shipments are more than twice as large for outsourcers as for non-outsourcers. Wages per worker, wages per production worker, and nonproduction wages are also all higher but by only a few thousand dollars in each case. Also, shipments and value added per worker are higher. Capital per worker is also slightly larger, while investment per worker is 14 percent higher. The composition of the labor force of outsourcing establishments is 3.4 percent more skill intensive.
The disparities between outsourcing and non-outsourcing establishments increase at the firm level. The employment and shipments of outsourcing establishments are now roughly seven and ten times as large respectively. Interestingly, differences in per-worker wages have almost completely disappeared or, as in the case of nonproduction workers, have reversed.
The results are similar to the differences between exporters and non-exporters found in Jensen's studies (1995, 1999) , but wages stand out as an exception. Exporters seem to compensate employees more than do non-exporters overall, a difference that tends to increase at the firm level. For outsourcing establishments, wages per employee are marginally higher than non-outsourcers, a difference that almost disappears at the firm level, even for skilled labor.
Drawing conclusions regarding the differences between outsourcing and nonoutsourcing organizations requires a more formal test. The next section investigates whether these differences are statistically significant after controlling for plant and firm characteristics.
Controlled OLS Regressions of Characteristics
I test for differences in characteristics between outsourcing and non-outsourcing organizations, using the following pooled specification for 1987 and 1992: 20 The outsourcing dummies for total wages per worker and total wages per nonproduction worker are both significant, whereas wages paid to production workers are not significantly different for outsourcers relative to non-outsourcers. Shipments, value added, capital, and investment are all significantly higher. The difference in the skilled-worker ratio is significant too, but it denotes only a 1.8 percent difference between outsourcing and nonoutsourcing establishments.
The firm-level results in table 8 are similar to the plant-level results but have larger coefficients. The regression for production worker wages is still insignificant, as is that for nonproduction worker wages with controls. Outsourcing firms have noticeably higher levels of employment and total shipments than do non-outsourcing firms: The differentials, at 81 percent higher and 113 percent higher, are much larger than those between outsourcing and nonoutsourcing plants.
For both the plant-and firm-level regressions of characteristics, the results on the exporting dummy are consistent with the results in the "exceptional" exporter literature. The coefficient on outsourcing status, even when controlling for exporting status, mirrors the existence of an exporter premia. The disparity between the exporting and outsourcing premia arises when comparing wages for outsourcing organizations with those for non-outsourcing organizations; a lack of premia not found in the exporting literature.
Why do we observe an outsourcing premium for every plant characteristic except 19 The specifications for total employment, total value of shipments, and fraction of nonproduction workers do not include the total employment control as an independent variable. The restricted-A and restricted-B subsamples have identical significance and similar coefficients. 20 In terms of interpretation, the Halvorsen and Palmquist adjustment for interpreting dummy variables in semilog regressions (1980) would make employment and value of shipments 46 percent and 66 percent larger for outsourcing establishments in the controlled specifications, not 38 percent and 51 percent, the actual coefficients.
production worker wages and for every firm characteristic except production and nonproduction worker wages? The reason behind the existence of wage premia for exporters, particularly wages per worker, is an open question possibly related to employee characteristics or efficiency wages.
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Interestingly enough, for this study the wage premium does not exist for outsourcers but does for exporters. One possible explanation for the lack of a premia for certain wages is that the substitution of imported intermediates for domestic production increases competition and eliminates any wage premium paid to employees.
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ESTIMATION RESULTS
Probit Analysis
The probit analysis tests whether an increase in total factor productivity raises the probability of outsourcing. I report the marginal effects from the pooled probit specifications of four specifications based on equation (6) The coefficient estimates for outsourcing are all significant at the 1 percent level for both plants and firms. Higher levels of total factor productivity increase an organization's probability of outsourcing. Across all specifications, the marginal effect of productivity declines as controls are added. To interpret these results, I multiply an increase in productivity of 1 standard deviation by the marginal effect from the probit. For plants in the unrestricted cases, an increase in productivity of 1 standard deviation raises the probability of outsourcing roughly 1.4 to 2 percentage points given a standard deviation in productivity of 1.31. The restricted samples of plants see an increase in the probability from 1.6 to 1.8 percentage points given a standard deviation of 1.5. For firms, we see a much higher probability of outsourcing for an increase in productivity of 1 standard deviation. Similar increases in productivity raise the probability of outsourcing 1.7 to 3.2 percentage points for all industries and 2.1 to 3.1 percentage points for the restricted cases, given standard deviations in productivity of 0.86 and 0.96 for the unrestricted and restricted cases respectively.
21 Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2004) find that the wage premium in linked employee-employer data for Germany disappears once employee characteristics are controlled for. 22 Senses (2005) argues that the threat of outsourcing increases the elasticity of labor demand. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) argue that outsourcing has contributed to the decrease in relative demand for unskilled labor. 23 Columns (4), (7-A), and (8-B) will be discussed in the multinational section.
An additional interesting marginal effect from the probit framework is the effect of being an exporter on outsourcing behavior. For both firms and plants in restricted and unrestricted cases, we see that being an exporter increases the probability of an organization's also being an outsourcer. The general range for this effect is between 17 percent and 28 percent. The high correlation between outsourcing and exporting activity is important not only for its own sake but also because it supports the idea that when researching outsourcing, one should account for export status and that, conversely, when researching exporting, one should account for outsourcing status.
Higher productivity is a factor in the determination of an organization's outsourcing behavior. For both firms and plants, the probit results are consistent with Antràs and Helpman's theory (2004) that organizations can be sorted into outsourcing and non-outsourcing forms on the basis of productivity levels.
Productivity Change Regressions
Does outsourcing status contain information regarding the growth in productivity of establishments and firms? The results of equation (7) For plants, the full, unrestricted sample of all industries and the restricted cases offer little evidence of higher mean rates of growth in productivity for establishments defined as outsourcers. Table 10 shows that only two of the specifications contain statistically significant coefficients on the outsourcing indicator. In addition, the significance and signs of the exporting dummy for plants are similar to the results presented in Jensen (1999, 2004a) .
The firm-level productivity change regressions in table 10, however, display interesting results for the coefficients on outsourcing. For each specification, and in both the unrestricted and the restricted cases, we see significantly higher rates of productivity growth for outsourcers.
These results range from 0.53 percent to 1.5 percent higher growth in log productivity for all industries. The restricted-A case is similar, exhibiting a premium that ranges from 0.89 percent to 1.46 percent for log productivity growth, while the restricted-B regressions find 0.76 percent to 1.48 percent higher growth rates for outsourcing firms.
Firm-Level Rationalization
What might explain the existence of outsourcing firms' productivity growth and the absence of any significant growth differential between outsourcing and non-outsourcing plants? At the industry level, a significant portion of productivity growth results from rationalization-the exit of inefficient plants and the reallocation of resources to more-efficient organizations. 24 A similar rationalization may hold at the firm level-a firm that chooses to import from abroad increases its average productivity through specializing and through reallocating resources to the more productive parts of the production process. This story would lead us to expect higher average productivity growth for outsourcing firms, holding alternative determinants of productivity growth constant. ln( )
and the second is
where X t is a vector of controls, including size, time, industry, and location. Given the rationalization hypothesis, we should expect that α 2 and β 2 are both negative and significant.
Although further, more expansive analysis of this hypothesis is left for future work, the coefficient estimates for α 2 and β 2 are telling. Both are significant at the 1 percent level:
α 2 =-0.0355, β 2 = -0.0063, and the standard errors for α 2 and β 2 are 0.0123 and 0.0015 respectively.
Multinational Status
The previous tests find that plants and firms are more likely to outsource the larger their productivity, that outsourcing plants and firms have a premium on characteristics, except for wages, and that firms, not plants, tend to have larger productivity growth over time. Neither the CMF nor the ASM collects information regarding plants' multinational status, but the LCSs of 1987 and 1992, used by Jensen (1998a, 1998b) and Bernard and Jensen (2005) , allow for the creation of an indicator of domestic multinational status. 25 The LCS is merged with the panels of estimated productivity, restricting the samples to only large U.S.-owned firms. As in previous work, the indicator for multinational status is The merged data excludes foreign-owned plants and firms. This omission is not a significant drawback, as the new sample allows the analysis to control for multinational status while identifying the importance of outsourcing through the variation between outsourcers and non-outsourcers. The tests in this section mirror those employed earlier, but they now include a dummy variable indicating multinational status.
Results of the Inclusion of Multinational Status
The low correlation between multinational status and outsourcing status predicts that the earlier results' significance should not change qualitatively when controlling for multinational status.
This prediction is exactly what occurs in the characteristics regressions and in the probit specifications. The regression results for dynamic productivity change are different, but I will argue that the change results from sample differences, not from the added control within the regressions. 24 Rationalization is defined by Head and Ries (1999) as a decline in the number of plants accompanied by increases in the output per plant. 25 BEA data, which are not available for this project, allow for the creation of an indicator of foreign multinational status. 26 The correlation between the multinational indicator and export status is 20 percent. This value is identical to that provided by Bernard and Jensen (2004a) .
I begin by presenting the controlled specifications of the characteristics regressions based on equation (8) (table 11). The results are strikingly similar quantitatively and in significance to the results found in table 8. The multinational indicator is also significant except in three specifications.
The probit analysis including the multinational indicator is presented in table 9, columns 4, 7-A, and 8-B. Again, there is no noteworthy change in the quantitative results, qualitative results, or significance of the regressions.
Next, I present the results of the dynamic specifications with the inclusion of the multinational control (table 12) . 27 Table 12 includes similar specifications to columns 4, 6-A, and 8-B from table 10. These specifications are identical to the previous regressions without the multinational control but are run on the smaller sample of the merged multinational data, whereas 4-MN, 6-A-MN, and 8-B-MN include the multinational control.
Unlike the earlier results for firms' productivity growth, the results here do not show a significant difference between the growth rates of log productivity over time. One possible cause for this departure from the earlier results might arise from the smaller sample that results from merging the ASM and the LCS. The fact that the outsourcing coefficients are almost the same for each case in table 12 presents evidence for this hypothesis.
To test this hypothesis, all three cases are tested for the difference in the outsourcing coefficient between the specifications with and without the multinational control. I draw 1,000
bootstrap samples for each test and report the This paper contains several key results. First, outsourcers are "outstanding" in that, compared with non-outsourcers, there are premia for outsourcers over non-outsourcing organizations for a variety of plant and firm characteristics. In other words, outsourcing plants and firms have significantly higher employment, shipments, value added, capital, investment, and skilled-worker fractions, even when controlling for various plant and firm characteristics. One exception to this outsourcing premia is that wages tend to be the same for both outsourcers and non-outsourcers. The absence of higher wages for outsourcing plants and firms contrasts with the wage premia in the "exceptional" exporting literature.
Second, organizations that outsource have higher total factor productivity. In addition to comparing the average productivity of outsourcing organizations with that of non-outsourcing organizations, I estimate a probit of the probability of outsourcing dependent upon productivity.
This specification is consistent with the theory that assumes that productivity is exogenous when choosing an outsourcing or non-outsourcing organizational form. An increase in productivity of 1 standard deviation raises the probability of outsourcing 1.61 to 2 percentage points for plants and 1.7 to 3.2 percentage points for firms.
Finally, given controls similar to those in the previous specifications, firm-level productivity growth is significantly higher for outsourcers, a result that does not hold at the plant level. An outsourcing firm's productivity growth is 0.53 to 1.50 percent higher per year than that of a non-outsourcing firm.
It is important to address the above-mentioned results in the context of the outsourcing debate. Outsourcers are an "outstanding" group of organizations along a variety of dimensions.
One exception, as noted previously, is that outsourcing firms and plants do not appear to pay employees any more than do non-outsourcing organizations. But, paying the same as the average firm is not a reason to hinder a production process that is becoming more prevalent among today's manufacturing organizations.
If outsourcing organizations were marginal and needed to decrease intermediate input costs to survive, the implications would be much different for policymakers. Because the results point toward outsourcers being "outstanding," anti-outsourcing legislation will affect the larger, more productive, and internationally competitive organizations. Thus, states that restrict outsourcing may drive away the largest and most productive organizations.
Much future work is warranted to complete our understanding of outsourcing. This paper does not delve deeply enough into the question of why firms may choose an outsourcing organizational form. To help answer this question, future research needs to explore industry and geographic variation. Although I did not report the values, the controls for industry and location are significant for certain four-digit industries and for particular states. Exploiting the detailed industry, product, and location information contained in the LRD may allow for the behavior of outsourcing organizations to be further analyzed.
Appendix: Capital Construction
I construct real capital stock from 1987 to 1996 using the LRD from 1982 to 1996. The LRD contains information on buildings and machinery, so each stock is calculated separately and then added together in order to arrive at the total capital stock for a given plant. Three steps are followed in order to arrive at the real capital stock utilized in the productivity estimations. is the capital stock at the end of the year and i t1 is investment during the year, and j is either buildings or machinery.
Depreciation is 5 percent and 10 percent for buildings and machinery, respectively. When MAB and BAB exist in the year in which a plant enters the dataset, or when the dataset starts, our initial capital stock for that year t is, for the case of capital machinery, -17,442.9 -15,829.3 -15,688.7 -3,795.7 -8,319.4 -13,620 .5 -2,062.9 -3,160.1 
Log-lhood
Firms: Restricted Cases
Note: Reported numbers are marginal effects from pooled probit regressions. In addition to industry and state controls, each regression includes a time dummy, Huber-White consistent standard errors, and corrects for within group dependence over time. ***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance respectively. Note: In addition to the controls given in the table, each regression uses Huber-White consistent standard errors and corrects for within group dependence over time. ***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance respectively. Note: Coefficients from a pooled regression on outsourcing dummy. Each regression includes a time dummy, Huber-White consistent standard errors, and corrects for within group dependence over time. ***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance respectively. Controls are added for size (except for shipments and employment specifications), industry, state, and multi-unit status. Note: Each above specification controls for industry, state, skilled labor fraction, and time, in addition to the above variates. Each regression uses Huber-White consistent standard errors and corrects for within group dependence over time. ***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance respectively.
Multinational
Firms
Results of Chi-Squared Test on Bootstrap Sample (1000 repetitions) Test of Difference between Outsourcing Coefficient for Two Specifications
